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1. Introduction 
 
This document presents the theoretical and methodological framework for work package 3 
(WP3) on “Consequences of dynamic growth” of  the DYNREG project. WP3 aims at 
understanding the consequences of dynamic growth on world patterns of trade, growth, 
development, competitiveness, inequalities and convergence. Particular emphasis will be 
given to assessing the impact of these effects on the EU competitiveness and growth 
prospects.  
In particular, WP3 aims to: 
o  Analyse the trends in comparative advantages in emerging regions and their 
determinants; 
o  Predict possible risks for EU competitiveness and its international positions as trading 
partner and source/recipient of FDI;  
o  Explore the relationship between openness and competitiveness; 
o  Determine whether and to what extent the emergence of dynamic regions has affected 
patterns of (in)equality and convergence both across emerging and developed 
countries and within the latter, with special emphasis on what might have been 
happened within the EU.  
o  Address socio-economic aspects of economic and technological tendencies, in order to 
understand whether and to what extent dynamic regions can be considered as learning 
regions;  
This paper sets out the methodological framework necessary for achieving these research 
objectives. The next section provides some stylized facts on the emergence of new 
competitors on the world scene, while section 3 provides an overview of theoretical and 
empirical approaches useful to structure the different operational phases of the research 
project and understand the ultimate results. Section 4 discusses the specific research questions 
that will be tackled by WP3. Section 5 describes the methodology that will be used in 
developing the project, and section 6 concludes with expected results and policy implications.  
 
 
2. Some stylized facts 
 
The past decade has been characterized by the emergence of new players in the world 
economy and global policymaking, affecting world trade, capital markets and investment 
decisions. This has raised the issue of whether this could cause  a major redistribution of 
competitiveness gains and losses across developed and less developed countries, reulting in   4
current account and welfare adjustments between old and new emerging economies, which 
find their leaders in Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC), not to mention Central and 
Eastern European countries which, with their dynamism, have sustained the EU growth in the 
recent years, allowing the Union to maintaining its international competitiveness.  
The BRIC countries’ growing impact on the global economy has been felt on a wide range of 
issues over the past few years: Tables 1 to 3 provide evidence of these facts, by comparing the 
performance of the old leading world economies , i.e. the United States of America, the EU 
and Japan with that of the above mentioned emerging countries.  
(insert table 1 about here) 
With average annual growth rates always larger than 7 per cent since the late 1980s, China 
can be considered as the most dynamic among the BRIC group. It is followed by India and 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), which have caught up and pass over Brazil 
since 1995. In the 2000 Russia also shows a sustained growth rate, very close to India’s one. 
Among old economies, only the USA experienced growth rates comparable with those of the 
BRIC and CEE countries, though they are more close to those of Brazil, the bad performer of 
the group in terms of growth, rather than those of China.   
The high growth rates have increased the BRIC and CEE countries importance in the global 
economy. Over the past 25 years, China has doubled its share in the global economy, which 
has increased from about 5% in the late 1980s to 12 % in the early 2000. Also India and the 
CEE countries show increasing shares in the global economy, but the improvements are less 
impressive than the Chinese case. Despite several slowdown episodes, Brazil can maintain its 
importance in the world economy, while Russia is still recovering the positions lost during the 
transition recession. It is worth noticing that the importance to global economy of mature 
economies has reduced over the considered period. 
The BRIC and CEE countries growth has led to a considerable increase in prosperity, too. 
From 1985 to 2004, GDP per capita PPP (in constant prices) has increased almost 
everywhere, with the exception of Russia. Needless to say, the largest increase has been 
recorded by China, followed by India, CEE and Brazil.
1  
The increasing importance of the BRIC and CEE countries to the global economy is reflected 
in their rapidly growing role in international trade and capital flows, as shown in table 2.  
While mature economies still dominate world trade, accounting for about 50% of world 
exports, over the past 25 years BRIC and CEE countries have gained importance, while old 
                                                 
1 These performances have been affected by demographic trends too, more dynamic in Brazil than in China 
(Jensen and Larsen, 2004)   5
economies have seen a reduction in their shares of world exports. As indicated by the 
dynamic RCA index, this redistribution of world exports between the two groups of countries 
has been determined by the great dynamism of BRIC and CEE country exports, which have 
been growing faster than world exports since 1985.  
Another interesting fact concerning the BRIC and CEE countries is the change in export 
composition. All the considered countries show increasing indexes for manufacturing exports 
and high tech exports. In the early 2000s, China’s shares of manufacturing exports and high 
tech exports were above the world average, as for the mature economies, whose indexes, 
however, show a downward trend. Brazil, India, Russia and the CEECs are still below the 
world average for both indexes. However, all these dynamic regions show an increase in the 
share of high tech exports, while the share of manufacturing exports decrease in Brazil and 
Russia, whose exports are still dominated by oil and gas production and mineral extraction. 
The greater integration into the world economy of BRIC and CEE countries is also witnessed 
by the increasing inflows of foreign capital gathered by these countries over the considered 
period. As indicated by the inward FDI performance index, Brazil, China and CEECs have 
attracted a considerable amount of FDI, larger than the amount suggested by the size of the 
respective economies, while in India and Russia there is still room for further FDI, despite the 
progress made over the past 25 years.
2  
(insert table 2 about here) 
This greater openness has brought more prosperity in all the considered areas, as it is shown 
in graph 1. All regions have followed similar patterns, though it is evident that the transition 
phase recession has limited growth opportunities for Russia and CEE countries, at least at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Especially China has undergone significant development both in 
terms of openness – measured by exports over GDP – and prosperity. During the last 15 
years, the degree of openness has increased approximately from 9 per cent to 39 percent, 
while GDP per capita has increased by more than 600 per cent.
3 As far as mature economies 
are concerned, openness has increased for the USA only, while Japan has regained the degree 
of openness it had at the beginning of the period. Quite surprisingly, the EU shows a 
reduction in openness over the period, only slightly mitigated by the East enlargement.  
(insert figures  1 and 2 about here) 
                                                 
2 This index is given by the ratio of the country share in world inward FDI to its share in world GDP (Unctad, 
1992) 
3 CEE’s improvements on both openness and prosperity side appear more impressive than the Chinese ones, 
when one considers as starting point 1990, i.e. the beginning of the transition phase, rather than 1985.     6
The characteristics of emerging economies of BRIC and CEE countries are also apparent 
from the indexes reported in table 3, which further illustrate the development patterns 
followed by this group of countries. The striking facts are, first of all, the increase in the share 
of Machinery and Transport equipment in the manufacturing value added in both Brazil and 
China; secondly, the increasing role played by Brazil, China and India in the world energy 
use; thirdly, an upgrading of the human capital and an increase in the patent applications 
particularly marked for India and CEE countries. Patent applications are almost everywhere in 
favour of non-resident, with the exception of the USA and Japan. This index clearly indicates 
on the one hand which countries are the source of technological innovations and which ones 
the users; on the other hand, the impressive technological upgrading of the emerging 
economies. Needless to say, the most important vehicles for technological diffusion have been 
international trade and foreign direct investment.  
(insert table 3 about here) 
 
 
3. The state-of-the-art  
 
3.1. The theoretical background 
The emergence of new players in the international arena has raised concerns on policy 
perspectives and stimulated the interest of several scholars – economists, political and 
development scientists – who have been asked to provide answers on the determinants and 
possible economic and political consequences at global level and in the mature economies of 
such a rapid growth.  
Economic consequences concern patterns of trade and FDI, and growth prospects at both 
national and international level. Needless to say, the impact on prosperity is a direct 
consequence of the adjustments in trade and FDI patterns generated by the emergence of 
dynamic regions.  
According to conventional trade theory, free trade, generated either by the unilateral reduction 
in trade barriers or the entry of a new player in the regional or global economic systems, can 
only have positive effects (Gandolfo, 1998). The opening up of trade will allow specialization 
on the basis of comparative advantages. How far different partners will benefit depend on 
their trade and industrial structure and how far these are complementary with those of the new 
player. If price and wages adjust flexibly to demand and supply factors, conventional trade 
theories do not see any concerns in the emergence of new players at international level. New 
specializations may emerge, provided that factors of production can freely move across   7
sectors but within countries. In such a world, either patterns of specialization or the size of the 
new player and the growth rate of its exports do not play any role: all activities are equally 
beneficial, all factors yield to equal returns at the margin, and adjustments are instantaneous 
and costless (Lall and Weiss, 2004). 
These predictions, however, are strongly related to the unrealistic hypotheses the conventional 
international trade models rely on. They include perfect competition and information, 
efficient markets, resources fully mobile within countries, exogenous technical change, no 
scale economies, and so on. If these assumptions are relaxed, the results can be quite 
different. Specialisation still generates benefits and trade remains a non-zero sum game. 
However, the distribution of such benefits depends on the ability of each country to create or 
attract competitive capabilities and to move into activities that offer the best opportunities for 
growth (Krugman and Venables, 1993).  
In this dynamic framework, increasing returns to scale, differentiated products and 
externalities play an important role (Krugman, 1980). First mover advantages can be 
important, too: if an industry is established in a country, its comparative advantage and 
competitive strength will grow relative to late-comers. Hence, both history and geography, by 
determining where economic activities initially concentrate, affect long run trade patterns 
(Krugman and Venables, 1990; Krugman, 1991). This cumulative gain process which make 
large markets even more large at the expense of the poor periphery, may come to an end and 
reverse if trade costs, broadly defined, substantially decrease and/or costs (i.e. wages, prices 
for houses and other congestion costs) in the core substantially increase. Regardless of where 
economic activity will eventually concentrate, these models predict an unequal distribution of 
economic activity over time and space (Puga and Venables, 1996).  
In conclusion, economies that lack the flexibility to move quickly from declining to 
expanding activity centres in response to changes in comparative advantage, may find that 
once producers in rival economies are well established, the process of catching-up may be 
lengthy and difficult and trade competition dangerous. In this respect, two opposite forces 
have to be evaluated. On the one hand, there is a demand effect and a specialization effect. 
Growing fast economies usually import more and its trade partners may benefit from these 
new market opportunities. The latter may arise in both consumer and intermediates markets. 
In particular, if a country is well endowed in raw materials or specialized in the production of 
intermediates which the emerging player needs for its own productions, it can take an 
advantage by further strengthening these specializations. On the other hand, rapidly growing 
countries may create difficulties to trade partners, by eroding their market shares – both   8
domestically and in third countries. A negative terms of trade effect may also arise when 
emerging economy’s demand for natural resources or intermediate inputs is strong enough to 
raise world prices, thus increasing the import prices trading partners have to pay for.  
In conclusion, the entry of a large competitor (or a group of efficient competitors) into world 
export markets can lead to significant adjustment costs and welfare losses, when changes in 
comparative advantage are not rapidly attained.  
The final outcome depends on at least three factors (Lall and Weiss, 2004): i) the degree of 
similarity in export structures of trading countries, with higher similarity leading to greater 
adjustments for the already established producers; ii) the speed, cost, nature and extent of 
these adjustments in each country; iii) the size of the emerging economy and its export growth 
rates.  
A large and rapidly growing economy may also attract consistent capital inflows, particularly 
FDI, at the expense of other similar, but not necessarily neighbouring countries. Domestic 
firms may learn from foreign companies about new products, production techniques and 
organization skills, thus increasing their performance.
4 This transfer of benefits may occur 
either voluntarily, through input - output linkages between domestic and foreign firms, or 
involuntarily through competition, imitation and training (Blomstrom et al. 2001). In both 
cases domestic firms become more productive and efficient, thus fostering local industrial 
development as suggested by several economists from Hirschman (1958) and Helpman, 
(1984), to Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen and Venables (1999).
5   
In pursuit of such benefits, governments have not only reduced barriers to FDI, but have also 
offered special incentives to attract foreign firms and foster relationships between 
multinationals and local firms. However, the effect of an upsurge of FDI into dynamic 
economies on other recipient countries is ambiguous (Weiss, 2004). If FDI flowing into 
developing countries are limited, then increasing receipts by a country will occur at the 
expense of other countries, and competition to attract foreign firms will become a zero-sum 
game with the success of one country at the expense of the others. However, if multinational 
corporations drive global production networks, with genuine specialization and international 
division of labour, FDI to one country may be complementary not competitive with FDI to 
other countries. 
                                                 
4 Needless to say, foreign firms may also generate negative effects for domestic firms, such as tougher 
competition in the final markets as well as in the source - i.e. labour – ones. A common belief, however, is that 
positive effects outweigh negative ones (UNCTAD, 2001). 
5 See Glass et al. (2000) for an in-depth survey of these and other theoretical literature concerning spillovers 
between domestic and foreign firms.   9
The issue of income convergence or divergence is not new. Initially, the debate seemed to be 
confined to exogenous growth models – such as those à la Solow (1956) – which predict 
convergence, vs. endogenous growth models à la Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986) in which 
divergence is a possible outcome. In these models, international trade amplifies the 
differences in factor endowments and technical progress between rich and poor countries, 
thus generating diverging income patterns (Baldwin et al., 2001). However, very recently it 
has been demonstrated that also in an endogenous growth framework convergence may arise 
because of either international trade (Walz, 1998) or the interaction between human capital 
and technological progress (Eicher, 1999).  
This inconclusiveness might be due to the fact that socio-cultural parameters have not been 
accounted for appropriately. Some scholars (Hodgson, 1988; Samuels, 1995 and Stanfield, 
1995) have recently shifted emphasis to socio-cultural characteristics of a locality (Healey, 
1997; Amin, 1999) looking at the socio-economy as a complex, dynamic and open-ended 
system. Here, economic success is related to advancement of institutional characteristics that 
generate consensus on the kind of collective game to play and the way to play it (Healey, 
1998: 1542). Amin and Thrift (1994, 1995) use the term ‘institutional thickness’ to describe 
these qualities, whereas Healey (1998) develops the concept of ‘institutional capital’ which 
maintains an analytical distinction between intellectual capital (this is knowledge resources), 
social capital (trust, reciprocity, cooperative spirit and other social relations), and political 
capital (capacity of collective action). 
The institutional-cultural environment, however, plays a multiple and complex role in the 
process of economic development. This is because it does not only constrain agency behavior, 
but also provides a cognitive framework through which raw information is interpreted and 
transformed into meaningful knowledge (Hodgson, 1988). On these grounds, regional 
economic growth is perceived as essentially a cognitive, learning and knowledge-building 
process (Hodgson, 1996, 2000; Knight, 1995).  
 
 
3.2. The empirical evidence 
Assessing the validity of the above mentioned theoretical statements requires detailed 
empirical analyses. The existing empirical evidence, however, is rather incomplete and 
fragmented. It focuses almost exclusively on the most important emerging economy, i.e. 
China, and possible impacts on its neighbouring Asian countries.    10
In order to organize the discussion, I focus on trade effects, FDI and prosperity impact 
separately, although in principle they may be related and isolating their impact may be 
difficult.  
Trade effects have been evaluated by the existing literature by using the traditional concepts 
of trade creation and trade diversion. The former occurs when trade flows are created by the 
emergence of a new trader at both regional and international level because its sustained 
internal growth increases imports (demand effect); the latter instead indicates that some 
countries may lose market shares because of the emergence of a new player. As suggested by 
the theory, the more similar are the economies, the more likely is trade diversion.  
According to the existing empirical evidence, the impact of rapidly growing Chinese exports 
on its Asian trading partners is ambiguous.   
By computing and comparing export shares of China and other Asia countries – i.e. 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines and Taipei – Weiss (2004 and 2005) argues 
that trade creation is likely to overcome trade diversion for all Asian countries.
6 The upsurge 
of Chinese exports has reduced their export shares in third markets (i.e. Japan and the USA); 
however, this negative effect has been compensated by an increase of export shares in the 
Chinese markets, due to the vertical specialization that seems to characterize the Asian region. 
Developing countries outside Asia and, in particular, Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
countries should be even less affected by the Chinese exports, since their economies are 
geographically distant and more complementary than similar to China’s economic system 
(Lall and Weiss, 2004). Looking at export share trends over time the authors argue that there 
has been room for some trade creation, as indicated by the increase of LAC countries’ shares 
in Chinese imports of primary and resource based product. As a matter of fact, Chinese 
market is on average of minor importance for LAC countries. Mexico and Costa Rica seem to 
be an exception, though they have suffered from Chinese competition in high tech sectors 
only. These latter, however, still represent a very small share of total exports in each of the 
three countries.  
OECD countries as well, seem to be negatively affected by the emergence of new traders at 
world level. A study by OECD (1998), in fact, shows that while China and other emerging 
Asian countries have gained export shares at world level and in the most important third 
country markets (i.e. Japan, the USA and Europe), the OECD countries have lost.  
                                                 
6 According to the authors, there is a competitive threat if China gains export market share and the other country 
loses. The intensity of the competition depends on the relative change.   11
Overall, these results indicate that emerging economies have become more important at the 
world level, while mature economies have lost export shares. However, these do not 
necessarily mean that the two phenomena are statistically correlated.  
In order to prove the existence of a causal relationship between the upsurge of China exports 
and the reduction of other countries’ export shares more sophisticated techniques have to be 
applied. By using a gravity approach, Eichengreen et al. (2004) demonstrate that China has 
crowded out exports of several Asian countries on third markets. This effect, however, is felt 
mainly in markets for consumer goods and, hence, by less developed Asian countries which 
export these goods. China has also increased imports from its Asian neighbours, but this 
direct effect is mainly felt in capital goods markets and thus by more advanced Asian 
countries. This analysis suggests that China’s emergence may affect less and more developed 
countries differently. Always by using econometric techniques, Cerra et al. (2005) show that 
reductions in tariff rates on U.S. imports from China have negatively affected imports from 
India, whose general welfare is likely to decrease because of China’s WTO entry.  
Several other scholars tried to evaluate the overall welfare changes generated by the 
integration of China within the WTO trade system (Ianchovichina and Martin, 2004; 
Ianchovichina at al., 2000; Adhikari and Yang, 2002; Hertel and Walmsley, 2002). All these 
studies share the same methodology, since they applied different version of the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) and its related databases. It is a general equilibrium model widely 
used in international trade policy analysis. These studies found that some Asian Countries, 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, together with LAC countries and Mexico will 
experience welfare losses, while China, Europe and the USA are among regions which will 
enjoy welfare gains from the China WTO accession. The intensity of these gains/loses vary 
across studies, according to the trade liberalization measures that have been included in the 
model, the time span and the version of the program used. This methodology, however, shares 
the same theoretical framework as traditional trade theory. Therefore, it predicts the gains 
from trade reforms in a world in which competitive threats are not a problem, because 
transitional difficulties are not accounted for. Therefore, it is likely that GTAP models over 
estimate possible consequences of China’s WTO entry.  
Even fewer studies have considered how China’s emergence as a favourite place for 
manufacturing FDI may affect FDI flows in other countries. By using a gravity approach to 
bilateral FDI flows in 14 Asian countries and China during the period 1984-2002, Mercereau 
(2005) found that FDI flows into two countries only (i.e. Singapore and Myanmar) have been 
negatively affected by China’s FDI inflows. Chantasasawat et al. (2004) confirm the lack of   12
FDI diversion in a similar study on FDI flows in China and other eight Asian countries. 
Eichengreen et al (2005) found a similar result, suggesting that it is due to the fact that in the 
Asian region foreign producers are likely to belong to a common supply chain. Evidence for 
FDI diversion, instead, has been found by Eighengreen et al. (2005) in the case of OECD 
countries. The authors argue that this is due to MNEs will to stay closer to the Chinese 
market. Japanese firms appear to be the leaders of both the above mentioned trends. Mixed 
empirical evidence also characterises the relationship between trade and income 
convergence/divergence. Sachs and Warner (1995), Ben-David (1996) and Rassekh (1992) 
find that international trade leads to income convergence, mainly among countries that are 
major trade partners. However, Slaughter (2001) finds no significant links between trade and 
convergence.   
When exploring this relationship at sub-national level, divergence patterns may emerge. Jin 
(2004) found that inland Chinese provinces which have been isolated from international trade 
for decades had their GDP growth negatively affected by increased openness. This study 
suggests that the interplay between international trade and growth may have severe spatial 
consequences; therefore patterns of adjustment within different nations can not be neglected 
for a comprehensive understanding of the impact of dynamic growth regions on trading 
partners.   
 
 
4. The research questions 
WP3 can contribute to the existing debate on the consequences of dynamic growth in 
emerging regions by providing answers to a number of questions which have been neglected 
by the literature up to now. Most of these questions concern the impact of dynamic growth in 
emerging regions on the EU and its member states.  
In particular, WP3 will try to provide an answer to the following research questions:  
1)  What is competitiveness? Which are the determinants of changing competitiveness in 
emerging regions? How do they compare with factors at the basis of EU’s 
competitiveness?  
While changes in competitiveness have been largely documented by the existing empirical 
evidence, its definition and, mainly, its determinants, have barely been considered, at least 
as far as emerging markets are concerned. Recent advances in international trade theory 
indicate that focusing solely on factor accumulation, as suggested by traditional growth 
theory is not sufficient because such models can not explain why some countries utilize   13
their resources more effectively than others. In this respect, three factors seem promising 
(Rassekh, 2004): 1) integration into the world economy (Frankel and Romer, 1999); 2) 
geography (Landes, 1998; Sachs, 2003) and 3) political and economic institutions (North, 
1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001).
7  
2)  Which is the impact of these changes in competitiveness on other countries, and mainly, 
on mature economies as the EU?  
Mature economies have not been properly considered in the analysis of the consequences 
of dynamic growth regions. The existing literature suggests that, generally speaking, the 
EU is likely to gain from the emergence of new players at world level. Whether this result 
may hold in the long run, we still do not know anything about short run adjustment costs, 
which may become important in a world characterized by product differentiation, 
externalities, factor immobility, prices and wages rigidities, as suggested by the literature 
previously discussed. Therefore, in order to completely understand possible consequences 
of dynamic growth regions on the EU, a partial equilibrium approach is necessary. As 
suggested by the literature, it has to consider both trade and investment flows, at both 
aggregate and sectoral level. The distribution of gains and losses across member states is 
also important, at least from a policy perspective.  
3)  Are openness and competitiveness two sides of the same coin?  
Another interesting issue not completely explained by the existing literature is the 
relationship between openness and competitiveness. In recent years, dynamic regions have 
been characterized by high level of openness and sustained growth rates. The EU has 
always adopted an open attitude towards trade partners: it is member of the WTO, and has 
signed a lot of PFTAs with less developed countries and privileged partners, i.e. other 
developed European countries. Last but not least, the number of member states has 
increased from 6 to 25 in the last 50 years and the enlargement process is not finished, yet. 
Despite this strong attitude towards openness, its economic performance has been quite 
poor. Has openness towards dynamic regions affected EU’s growth performance at firm, 
sector and regional level?  
4)   What is the impact of changes in trade and FDI flows on patterns of inequalities, 
convergence and divergence at world level and, mainly, within the EU? 
                                                 
7 The role played by economic integration – both in terms of trade and FDI – and institutional qualities has been 
also stressed by some studies discussing the reasons of China’s success (Adams et al., 2006; Jensen and Larsen, 
2004; Lai, 2004; and Liu and Shu, 2004).   14
The final issue concerns the effects of the above mentioned changes on trade and FDI 
flows on patterns of inequalities, convergence and divergence at world level, and, mainly 
within the EU. In this respect, several questions are still unexplored. In particular, which 
factors affecting competitiveness are able to reduce inequalities within and across 
countries? Do patterns of (in)equality and convergence within the EU change because of 
the effects generated by dynamic growth regions? In which directions? Which socio-
cultural processes characterize dynamic regions growth patterns? Do they generate 




5. Methodology  
WP3 aims at empirically exploring the above mentioned questions using appropriate statistics 
and econometric techniques. In order to explore as much issues as possible, the WP3 will be 
organized through several complementary research papers. Co-operation and cross-
fertilization across research teams will take the risk of inefficiencies and overlapping of tasks 
at the minimum.  
Since each contribution will explore a single issue, country coverage, time span and the level 
of disaggregation of the analysis at both geographical and sectoral level may change 
according to the research objectives and the availability of data.  
 
5.1 Sources of data 
Analyses within WP3 will be based on secondary source data on trade, FDI, factors of 
production and other socio-economic characteristics of both emerging and mature economies. 
Useful data on import and export flows can be found in UN-COMTRADE, IMF-DOT and 
COMEXT databases. The latter focuses on EU only, while the other two cover all countries in 
the world. Trade flows are recorded bilaterally and according to several level of sectoral 
disaggregation. Time span is quite long in each database, but it may vary country by country. 
Statistics on trade flows at sub-national level are usually under the responsibility of nations 
and therefore are more difficult to find within the EU and, mainly, in the emerging regions.  
Data on FDI at country level are provided by UNCTAD, World Bank (WDI) and OECD. The 
former provides statistics for FDI flows and stocks as well as several indexes of FDI 
penetration. Data at sub-national level can be collected through several national sources. The 
AMADEUS database collects information at firm level (ownership included) for several   15
European countries. ISLA-Bocconi disposes of a firm level database on foreign investment in 
several Central and Eastern European countries.  
Several publicly available databases (WDI, Penn World Tables, IMF financial statistics, 
OECD, etc.) can be exploited in order to get measures for socio-economic characteristics at 
country level. National statistics Offices may be contacted in order to get the same measures 
at sub-national level.  
 
5.2 Research papers, responsibilities and deliverables  
WP3 is expected to answering the above mentioned research questions through the delivery of 
the following research output by February 2008:  
1.   Trends in comparative advantages of emerging regions and their determinants 
1.1  Institutional quality and comparative advantages: an empirical investigation (UNIBOC) 
1.2  Determinants of competitiveness and shifting comparative advantages in the world 
economy (ESRI) 
1.3   Export performance: does destination matter? The case of Ireland (ESRI) 
1.4  Export performance: does innovation matter? (IER) 
 
2.  The impact of dynamic growth in emerging regions on trade, income, convergence 
patterns in the world economy 
2.1  The impact of emerging regions on EU export flows: a gravity approach (UNIBOC) 
2.2  Is FDI to China crowding out FDI flows to the EU? (ESRI) 
2.3  The dynamics of an emerging middle class and middle class entrepreneurship in 
dynamic growth regions (VUB) 
 
3.   Dynamic growth, inequality and social cohesion 
3.1  The role of entrepreneurship, institutions and knowledge infrastructure on regional 
disparities (VUA) 




WP3 aims at obtaining empirical evidence on the consequences of dynamic growth in 
emerging regions, such as Brazil, Russia, India China and new EU member states of Central 
and Eastern Europe on world patterns of trade, FDI, and growth. Changes in international 
competitiveness of mature and emerging regions will be carefully evaluated and their   16
consequences on patterns of (in)equality and convergence will be the subject of in –depth 
analyses carried out by a comparative and multidisciplinary perspective.  
Once identified these stylised facts, we will be able to evaluate the contribution of trade, 
relative to other factors, on growth patterns of emerging regions and possible consequences 
for growth patterns at world level, in terms of convergence and divergence between 
developed and developing regions.  
The position of the EU at the international level and the spatial implications of changes in its 
competitiveness will be carefully evaluated in order to draw lessons and policy implications 
for the Lisbon agenda as well as for policies in the areas of enterprise, innovation, trade, and 
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Table 1 – GDP performance indicators 
1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Brazil
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 6792 6561 7120 7419
share of world GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, bill.) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
GDP growth rate 1.44 2.90 2.54 2.30
GDP growth rate/world GDP growth rate 0.39 1.14 0.71 0.79
China
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 1422 2098 3255 4420
share of world GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, bill.) 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.12
GDP growth rate 7.87 12.43 8.19 8.12
GDP growth rate/world GDP growth rate 2.10 4.82 2.25 2.28
India
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 1529 1802 2213 2616
share of world GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, bill.) 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
GDP growth rate 6.40 5.16 5.71 6.11
GDP growth rate/world GDP growth rate 1.71 2.00 1.57 1.72
CEE
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 9573 8624 9635 11660
share of world GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, bill.) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
GDP growth rate … 2.70 3.08 4.10
GDP growth rate/world GDP growth rate 1.15 1.06 0.86 1.13
EU-15
GDP per capita, PPP/world GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 intern 19732 21920 24853 28477
share of world GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, bill.) 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.20
GDP growth rate 3.32 1.59 2.68 1.51
GDP growth rate/world GDP growth rate 0.89 0.62 0.74 0.42
USA
GDP per capita, PPP/world GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 intern 26889 29078 32147 34862
share of world GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, bill.) 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21
GDP growth rate 3.42 2.55 3.60 2.92
GDP growth rate/world GDP growth rate 0.91 0.99 0.99 0.82
Japan
GDP per capita, PPP/world GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 intern 20949 24244 25600 26479
share of world GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, bill.) 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07
GDP per capita growth rate/world GDP per capita growth rates 2.15 1.11 0.47 0.45
GDP growth rate 4.74 1.49 1.30 1.24
GDP growth rate/world GDP growth rate 1.27 0.58 0.36 0.35
Russia
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 2648 2067 1614 2019
share of world GDP, PPP (constant 2000 international $, bill.) 1.29 0.87 0.58 0.61
GDP growth rate … -9.08 1.62 6.08
GDP growth rate/world GDP growth rate … -3.53 0.44 1.71 
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Table 2 – Trade performance indexes 
1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Brazil
Share of world exports of goods and services 0.988 0.847 0.815 0.888
Dynamic RCA  0.36 1.03 0.95 1.57
HT exports (% of manufactured exports)/HT world exports 0.38 0.30 0.48 0.79
Manufactures exports/world manufactures exports 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.71
Inward FDI performance index 0.49 0.52 1.24 1.46
China
Exports of goods and services (% of total world) 1.266 1.799 2.909 4.582
Dynamic RCA  1.14 2.55 3.10 2.58
HT exports (% of manufactured exports)/HT world exports … 0.43 0.69 1.06
Manufactures exports/world manufactures exports 0.93 1.06 1.14 1.17
Inward FDI performance index 1.04 4.76 1.81 1.36
India
Exports of goods and services (% of total world) 0.53 0.56 0.67 0.83
Dynamic RCA  0.92 1.31 2.16 1.26
HT exports (% of manufactured exports)/HT world exports 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.24
Manufactures exports/world manufactures exports 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99
Inward FDI performance index 0.08 0.27 0.26 0.25
Russian Federation
Exports of goods and services (% of total world) … 1.44 1.39 1.58
Dynamic RCA  … … 0.97 1.74
HT exports (% of manufactured exports)/HT world exports … … 0.57 0.71
Manufactures exports/world manufactures exports … … 0.33 0.28
Inward FDI performance index … 0.11 0.39 0.42
CEE
Exports of goods and services (% of total world) 1.501 1.396 2.121 2.696
Dynamic RCA  0.00 2.93 1.40 2.18
HT exports (% of manufactured exports)/HT world exports … 0.21 0.29 0.30
Manufactures exports/world manufactures exports 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.97
Inward FDI performance index 0.08 2.08 1.67 1.25
EU-15
Exports of goods and services (% of total world) 41.90 40.86 38.42 33.52
Dynamic RCA  1.22 0.78 0.50 0.02
HT exports (% of manufactured exports)/HT world exports 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.87
Manufactures exports/world manufactures exports 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.03
Inward FDI performance index 1.38 1.34 1.55 1.64
USA
Exports of goods and services (% of total world) 12.36 12.86 13.20 11.84
Dynamic RCA  0.98 1.01 1.40 0.19
HT exports (% of manufactured exports)/HT world exports 1.86 1.81 1.58 1.53
Manufactures exports/world manufactures exports 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.07
Inward FDI performance index 1.21 0.72 0.83 0.52
Japan
Exports of goods and services (% of total world) 8.30 7.98 6.83 5.90
Dynamic RCA  0.78 1.09 0.31 0.53
HT exports (% of manufactured exports)/HT world exports 1.35 1.37 1.28 1.22
Manufactures exports/world manufactures exports 1.36 1.29 1.24 1.22
Inward FDI performance index 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07  
Source: own elaboration from WDI data.   22
Table 3 – Industry performance indicators 
1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-04
Brazil
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 23.30 20.85 19.78 20.00
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) 24.79 26.09 27.19 …
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 31.83 24.44 19.50 13.04
Patent applications, nonresidents/residents … 8.36 24.82 18.63
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 11.34 11.34 15.00 18.43
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)/World energy use 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.019
China
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 21.30 20.02 19.27 17.50
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) 25.29 24.89 27.42 31.05
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 34.52 33.72 34.37 37.64
Patent applications, nonresidents/residents … 3.15 4.56 3.70
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 2.94 2.94 7.80 12.76
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)/World energy use 0.096 0.107 0.117 0.117
India
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 13.60 13.17 12.90 …
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) 25.16 24.70 22.24 18.55
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 16.65 16.75 16.54 15.52
Patent applications, nonresidents/residents … … 8.11 424.35
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 6.21 6.21 10.72 11.41
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)/World energy use 0.040 0.045 0.050 0.052
Russia
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 40.20 37.78 30.70 …
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) … 22.92 20.45 21.18
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)
Patent applications, nonresidents/residents … … 2.31 3.36
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 53.32 … 69.60
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)/World energy use 0.08 0.06 0.06
CEE
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 43.11 37.27 33.57 …
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) 29.90 20.22 17.68 20.76
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 37.40 27.94 22.03 20.61
Patent applications, nonresidents/residents … 50.38 72.67 172.16
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 30.31 32.66 36.60 …
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)/World energy use 0.039 0.031 0.028 0.025
EU-15
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 31.00 29.69 27.96 27.51
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) 24.10 24.22 27.84 24.29
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 22.96 21.41 20.40 18.56
Patent applications, nonresidents/residents … 5.17 11.51 16.81
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 34.76 34.76 52.70 57.08
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)/World energy use 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15
USA
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 27.10 24.68 23.55 22.65
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) 33.01 31.50 32.41 29.76
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 20.12 18.83 17.79 15.92
Patent applications, nonresidents/residents … … 0.90 0.93
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 72.37 72.37 71.25 78.40
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)/World energy use 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Japan
Employment in industry (% of total employment) 34.27 34.17 32.48 30.85
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing) 38.44 38.16 38.26 35.43
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 27.18 24.89 22.48 21.08
Patent applications, nonresidents/residents … … 0.21 0.28
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 0.19 0.21 0.97 3.26
Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)/World energy use 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05  
Source: own elaboration from WDI data.   23
Figure 1 – Openness and prosperity in emerging economies 
































Source: Own elaboration from WDI data 
 
Figure 1 – Openness and prosperity in mature economies 
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